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RECENT BOOKS
BooK REVIEWS
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE. By Jon R. Waltz and Fred E. lnbau.
New York: Macmillan. 1971. Pp. 398. $10.95
In the decades following World War II it became common practice in the large medical schools and centers of the United States to
arrange some sort of course or educational process by which it was
hoped to acquaint the embryonic physicians with legal concepts,
ideas, procedures, and institutions. This was often done by a series
of lectures presented to the senior class under the title of "medical
jurisprudence" or "professional responsibility" or some other such
designation. Generally speaking these efforts received the support
of law school faculties and practicing lawyers; professors and practitioners donated their time to the preparation of syllabi, mitneographed materials, and the delivery of lectures presumably suitable
for consumption and digestion by nonlawyers.
.
In recent years, however, there have been indications that this
kind of program is falling into disfavor. In The University of Michigan School of Medicine, which has undergone far-reaching changes
in its curricular arrangements, the lectures that were being delivered
during the student's senior year were first shifted to the junior year
and then for all practical purposes terminated. Their place has been
taken by some sort of elective reading course or exercise that is quite
different from the earlier, more formal arrangments. It is understood
that similar developments have occurred at other medical-education
centers.
The reason or reasons underlying this phenomenon are not
readily apparent to one not privy to the inner sanctum of medical
school planning committees. The crowded curriculum; the greater
emphasis in these latter days upon clinical experience; perhaps a
revulsion against so-called "didactic teaching" methods; all are said
to have played a part in the reduction and abandonment of the
program. Whatever the cause, there are some who regret that physicians are completing their medical education without much understanding of the legal system under which they live and with which
they seem to have an increasing amount of trouble. It was often said
that if the law discussions did nothing else, at least they dispelled
some of the irrational fears of law from which physicians suffer and
disabused them of much medical school superstition, illusion, and
folklore concerning law. The writer of this review has a distinct
impression, judging from the calls he receives from interns and resi:
dents at the Medical Center in Ann Arbor, that a great many young
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physicians are· coming to their profession profoundly ignorant of the
nature of the real world, legally speaking.
Graduates of the Northwestern University Medical School, however, need not labor under this handicap if they take advantage of
the good offices of Professors Waltz and Inbau. As manifested at
the outset of the book here reviewed, the volume is designed for
practitioners and students of medicine. It is intended to be read and
studied by medical students and medical doctors, and the authors
are quite emphatic that while they hope the book will be useful to
lawyers it should not be regarded as a book intended primarily for
lawyers. This injunction necessarily precludes certain criticisms that
might be leveled against the book by a lawyer. On the other hand,
the creation of a work on law intended to be read and taken seriously
by nonlawyers casts certain special responsibilities upon the shoulders
of the authors. More on this point later.
The book is divided into three parts: "The Physician and the
Civil Law," "The Physician and the Criminal Law," and "The Physician in Court." The center of attention, however, is manifested by
the number of pages devoted to the three areas. The first part involves 323 pages, the second 37 pages, and the third only 8 pages.
For purposes of this review I consider the three parts in reverse
order of their appearance. The part on the physician as a witness
includes an abbreviated description of the role of the witness at a
trial and ten suggestions for physicians called to that role. Some of
these suggestions have merit ("Confer with the Lawyer Calling you as
a Witness"-p. 375); some are of less value ("Do Not Be Nervous or
Frightened"-p. 373). Teachers who use the book and cover this
subject ought to ask the student to reread pages 6 to 13 involving
"The Litigation Process" and pages 34 to 37 covering "The Interprofessional Code for Physicians and Attorneys." The Code has been
included in the chapter called "Private Canons of Professional and
Interprofessional Conduct" (p. 29); it is a very bland statement but
is mildly suggestive of some of the matters that really cause irritation
between the professions. It might have been wiser to include a state
code of interprofessional conduct comparable to Michigan's code 1
which gets closer to the nitty gritty of why physicians shy away from
being a witness and why attorneys complain about the conduct of
physicians who are called upon to help in the administration of
justice. In summary, Part Three serves a function but is clearly a
minor sideshow in the book.
Part Two, "The Physician and the Criminal Law," contains three
chapters. One relates to the medical practitioner and physical evidence in criminal cases, another to the estimation of time of death
and the interval between occurrence of injury and death, and the
th_i~d to criminal laws of special importance to the physician. The
I. 60
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first of these chapters has a wealth of valuable suggestioi:is concerning.
the identification and preservation in criminal cases of tangible evidence such as bullets, blood specimens, swabs, and so on; the handling
of injured persons, dead bodies, and property in such a way as not to
add to the difficulties of police investigators; and the proper documentation of external wounds. In the latter connection reference is made
to the assassination of President Kennedy and the failure to document properly the exit bullet wound in the neck prior to the tracheotomy (p. 330). The discussion of the estimation of the time of
death and the interval between injury and death occupies less than
nvo pages. An extensive bibliography is attached. In the last chapter
of this Part, only three crimes are listed as being of special importance to the physician: abortion, criminal homicide, and failure to
report criminally inflicted injuries or habitual use of narcotic drugs.
It is clear from the foregoing that "forensic medicine" is not a
subject of major importance in the book nor is the relationship of
the physician to the criminal law.
The main focus of the work concerns the physician and the civil
law with the bulk of the attention and space devoted to the professional liability of the physician. There is a ten-page chapter on
"Licensing Laws" (pp. 17-28) but it consists largely of a summary of
The Illinois Medical Practice Act.2 Starting with Chapter 4, "Liability for Professional Negligence: Medical Malpractice," we find
the raison d'etre of the book.
The presentation of the basic elements of professional liability
or negligence will be helpful to any interested lay reader. There
are intelligible discussions of the nature of the various duties owed
. by the physician to his patient; the "school rule"; the "locality rule"
and the modern tendency to limit its operation and change the
standard to a national one; the requirement of expert testimony and
the problems attendant upon its procurement; the various devices
utilized by the courts and by some legislatures to overcome the
difficulties of obtaining expert testimony; vicarious liability; emergency treatment; and the defenses to actions for negligent treatment.
All bases are touched although one might not be entirely satisfied
with the approach or depth of treatment in some areas. For example, in the subdivision relating to the use of impartial medical
panels there is a discussion of the "Arizona Plan>f and the "California Plan" of extrajudicial screening of medical malpractice cases.
It would also have been worthwhile to mention the New Jersey
Plan8 which is based upon a court rule rather than local agreements·
between the professional societies. That system, once invoked, may
result in an adverse decision binding upon the claimant if he has
so agreed, and even without agreement such a decision precludes his
2. !LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
3. N.J. CIV. PRAc. R.ULE 4:21.
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attorney from initiating any further proceedings in the case. It resembles a type of binding arbitration arrangement and the significance of this general kind of system is probably growing in the
country. At any rate physicians ought to know of it. Apart from
this and a few other minor deficiencies, the discussion of professional liability for negligence is commendable.
The question of "abandonment" is carefully analyzed and some
needed distinctions are drawn, which, if observed, should have the
effect of eliminating some of the confusion that has characterized
this area of law. Other chapters that make worthwhile contributions
to the literature of the field include those treating the problems of
experimental and innovative therapy, homotransplantation of tissues
and organs, the public health and child abuse reporting requirements, and the physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege. All of these chapters will surely be helpful to the
reader.
One of the most interesting discussions in the book is found in
Chapter 11 which takes up that modern conundrum "Informed
Consent." For more than a decade courts and commentators have
been struggling with the conceptual and practical aspects of this
phase of professional liability. The authors of this book, recognizing
the confusion that has existed, undertake a valiant effort to clear
the air by suggesting some new paths of analysis. At the outset they
manifest an understanding of the distinction between the case in
which plaintiff claims the physician proceeded, without any semblance of consent, to do something that the patient did not know
he was going to do, and the case based on the theory that although
the patient consented to the procedure he was not advised fully
enough of the collateral risks attendant upon it. Regardless of
whether one feels sympathetic toward this type of analytical reasoning, it is a satisfaction to this reviewer to find writers who commence their discussion of the subject cognizant of the classification;
some courts and ·writers have either ignored it or failed to understand it. As to the first class of cases, there is little to be discussed;
the courts have consistently held that there is liability on the part
of a physician who performs a medical procedure without having
procured the consent of the patient either through express articulation or proper inference from conduct. The authors commendably
center their attention upon the second class of cases, namely those
iµ which it is claimed that collateral risks were not sufficiently disclosed.
New lines of distinction are suggested which ought to prove
fruitful. The first is the difference between furnishing information
and procuring corfs.ent. As to furnishing in~ormation, risks that could
be disclosed are separated from psks that should be disclosed. The
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former category really raises the question to what extent the physician should have been aware of a risk of which he was in fact
ignorant and which he therefore could not disclose. The second category raises the question, granting that the physician knew of the risk
and did not disclose it, whether the circumstances were such that
he ought to have warned of it. There follows a perceptive appraisal
of the kind of factors that should be taken into account in determining the obligation of the physician to disclose collateral risks
of which he is aware. The authors' suggestions are not likely to
provide a simple touchstone that will satisfy all medical critics of
the entire theory, but it is the belief of this reviewer that lawyers
and courts confronting the problem in the future will be pointed
in the proper direction by the suggestions made in this book.
One aspect of Chapter 11 merits adverse criticism in this reviewer's judgment. It is that portion headed "Extension of the
Field of Operation" (pp. 174-77). Here it seems that the authors confuse their personal views as to what the rules ought to be with what
the rules actually are. This is a not uncommon failing among law
students and law teachers. After a somewhat disconcerting misinterpretation of an article ·written by this reviewer in 1968,4 the
authors purport to summarize the law relating to the extension of
an operation by a surgeon. In this connection it is clear that they
espouse the "more enlightened view [that] a surgeon is empowered
by law to extend the operation to any abnormal condition discovered during the operation if doing so is advisable for the patient's
welfare and comports with the accepted practice of surgeons generally" (pp. 175-76).
.
Four cases are used to support this general proposition. There is
initial reliance on certain dicta in a 1943 opinion of the District of
Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals.5 The patient's husband was
sued by the surgeon for his fee. The husband defended on the ground
that there had been an unauthorized operation on the wife. Plaintiff had operated on her for what he diagnosed as a tubular pregnancy; he discovered that she had a normal pregnancy but acute
appendicitis and proceeded to remove the diseased appendix. In
disallowing the patient's claim that the removal of the appendix
was unauthorized, the court uses some extremely broad language
concerning the desirability of the physician doing what he did. 6
The case is a poor one, of course, in which to raise the consent issue
because without having suffered any harm the patient was refusing
to pay what was apparently an otherwise unobjectionable fee. The
4. Plant, An Analysis of "Informed Consent", 36 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 639 (1968). See
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE at 174 and nn.105-07. .
5. Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 -A.2d 626 (Mun. Ct. ·App. D.C: 1943).
6. 34 A.2d at 629, quoted on p. 176 of MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE.

646

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 70

authors dismiss this feature as a "curious twist,". but in the real
world an intangible factor such as this one carries considerable
weight in disposing a court to look with disfavor upon a defense
that was obviously an afterthought. Furthermore, the holding of the
case was expressly based on the "emergency" doctrine, as the authors
indicate (p. 175). To this reviewer it seems unwise to leave the impression that the case is "typical" of the judicial approach.
The second case used to support the authors' preferred view is
Kennedy v. Parrott,1 a 1956 North Carolina decision in which the
surgeon, while performing an authorized appendectomy, found cysts
on the patient's ovaries and punctured them. The patient later developed a phlebitis and brought suit. The claim was somewhat
ambiguous and the causal relation between the puncture and the
phlebitis was not proved. In appealing from a judgment of involuntary nonsuit, plaintiff asserted that the puncturing of the cysts had
been an unauthorized procedure. In affirming the judgment the
North Carolina Supreme Court used some very broad language of
which the authors approve. Similarly in the third case, a 1912 New
Jersey opinion8 relied on heavily by the North Carolina Court, some
very broad dicta are found.
The poorest authority cited, however, is King v. Carney, 0 a 1922
Oklahoma case. This case is referred to by the authors as a "key"
case and is represented as holding that a patient's request to a physician that she be "fixed up" so that she could have children could
be interpreted as a general grant of authority to the surgeon to do
whatever he deemed advisable, including removal of her Fallopian
tubes and ovaries when he discovered they were in a diseased condition. The authors say:
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma interpreted the plaintiff's request
to be "fixed up" as authority for a diagnostic operation and such
additional surgery as might be necessary to rectify her condition.
Since her condition before the removal of the diseased· organs already made it impossible for her to bear children, and this condition
could not be reversed, the surgeon was free to act as he did. [P. 177.]
It is difficult to see how anyone who reads the King opinion carefully
can cite it for the foregoing proposition. The case came to the
supreme court on the specific question of the admissibility of the
surgeon's testimony that "the fallopian tubes and ovaries and sur-.
rounding tissue were so badly diseased, that it was necessary to remove the diseased organs and affected parts in order to preserve
the plaintiff's life and health, and that it would have b~en dangerous
7. 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
8. Berman v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L, 20, 83 A. 948 (1912).
9. 85 Okla. 62, 204 P. 270 (1922).
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to her life and health not to do so."10 An objection to that testimony
was sustained by the trial court and verdict and judgment were for
plaintiff. The supreme court reversed saying:
If, in the course of an operation to which the patient consented,

the physician should discover conditions not anticipated before the
operation was commenced, and which, if not removed, would endanger the life or health of the patient, he would, though no express
consent was obtained or given, be justified in extending the operation
to remove and overcome them.11
The foregoing is a statement of the conventional emergency
doctrine. The court emphasized that point:
Evidence tending to show that on account of conditions discovered
by proper diagnosis the operation was necessary to save the life of
the patient, tended to show that the operation was authorized under
the foregoing principle.12
This reviewer does not know what a "key" case is in the context
in which the authors use the term. However, even if the case stood
for the general proposition that they espouse, it was decided in 1922
and in the almost fifty years that have followed has been cited only
nine times in judicial opinions.13 Each time, as I read those opinions,
it has been cited for the emergency exception to the consent requirement; I find no instance in which it has been cited for the proposition the authors claim it exemplifies.
The foregoing criticism is not intended as mere nit-picking or
caviling at the legal analysis displayed by the authors or their assistants. It is more serious. In a book intended for use by nonlawyers,
a writer bears a serious responsibility to distinguish between his own
views and the courts' holdings; that responsibility is greater than in
a bobk intended to be read and analyzed by legally trained people.
Law students, law professors, and practicing lawyers are competent
to discriminate between what writers say the law ought to be an<l
what the cases actually hold. Medical students and physicians cannot
be counted upon to possess this ability. It would be fairly easy to
imagine a case in which a surgeon who had imbibed the authors'
suggestions in this subdivision, and who had not procured a broad,
10. 85 Okla. at 63, 204 P. at 271.
11. 85 Okla. at 64, 204 P. at 272.
12. 85 Okla. at 64, 204 P. at 272.
13. Gray v. Grunnagle, 433 Pa. 144, 152, 223 A.2d 663, 667 (1966); Chambers v.
Nottebaum, 96 5.2d 716, 719 (Ct. App. Fla. 1957); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355,
361, 90 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1956); Higley v. Jeffrey, 44 .Wyo. 37, 43, 8 P .2d 96, 97 (1932);
13a.xter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 234, 2 P.2d 257, 263 (1931); Jackovach v. Yocom, 212
Iowa 914, 927, 237 N.W. 444, 450 (1931); McGuire v. Rix, ll8 Neb. 434, 440, 225 N.W.
120, 123 (1929); Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 591, 253 P. 363, 364 (1927); Hershey v.
Peake, 115 Kan. 563, 565, 223 P. 1113, 1114 (1924).
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carefully worded consent, could get into serious difficulty by doing
what he thought was the proper thing but which was clearly outside
the limits of the emergency doctrine. A recent case in Michigan in
which an opthamologist got into exactly this sort of trouble is
Shulman v. Lerner,14 a 1966 decision in which a judgment for
$12,500. was affirmed. Fortunately such cases are unique; but that
is because it is the general practice for surgeons to procure a written
consent expressly authorizing procedures deemed advisable even in
the absence of emergency. It is not because the principle propounded
in this subdivision of the book has achieved general acceptance.
Despite the criticism suggested in the last preceding paragraphs,
this reviewer wishes to make it clear that he considers the presentation of these authors in general to be a worthy and commendable
work. The book is well suited for the use of medical students and
physicians, at least those who are seriously interested in the subject
matter. Such an appraisal assumes that it is desirable to acquaint
members of the medical profession with the elements of the legal
system. It is, of course, undesirable to leave them with the impression that they are competent to function as their own legal counsel
or to make legal decisions without advice from professional sources.
This book does not leave that impression nor could it properly be
so read. It should make clear to those members of the beleaguered
profession who read it that the law is not a mysterious or occult
area; that the legal system has more merit than would appear from
recent discussions of the subject in their professional magazines; and
that many of their fears are without foundation. It is hoped that
numerous medical students and physicians will read and study this
book. They will be better informed and probably wiser for having
done so.
Marcus L. Plant,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan

